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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY BUZIANIS, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, . 
vs. CASE NO. 14257 
• 
BENEFICIAL HOMES, INC./ a 
Utah Corporation, and RON 
GIBB, : 
Defendants-Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Beneficial Homes, Inc. and Ronald Gibb 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought to enforce a promissory note 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At trial the defendants furnished evidence in the form 
of checks in attempt to prove that certain payments had 
been made against the promissory note. The trial court 
determined that the defendant was to receive credit for 
some of the checks but not others. The trial court 
awarded judgment to the plaintiffs in the amount of 
$5,500.00 plus $1,081.35 interest plus court costs of 
$37.80 and attorneys fees in the sum of $2,227.11. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants-appellants seek a reversal of the judgment 
entered by the trial court on July 31, 1975 on the grounds 
that evidence was erroneously excluded at trial. That the 
judgment failed to give the defendants credit for a check 
which had been admitted at trial. That the defendants-
appellants should not be bound by the terms of the Stipula-
tion entered into at trial and that the award of attorneys 
fees were not supported by fact and were unreasonable under 
the circumstances. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 14, 1971, parties entered into a promissory 
note wherein defendant, Ronald Gibb, agreed to pay plaintiff the amount 
of $7,500.00. The payments were to be made at the rate of $500.00 per 
lot when sold. 
Plaintiff filed suit against the defendants in March of 197 4 
alleging that defendants owed the amount of $6,681.35 on the above 
described promissory note. 
At trial the parties entered into a stipulation presented to 
the Court which apparently provided that judgment would be granted 
against the defendant as prayed in the Complaint but that it would not 
be entered until July 14th.(Tr.2). Defendants were given until July 
14th to prove they were entitled to credit for amounts already paid on 
the promissory note.(Tr.2). Defendant-appellant, Ron Gibb, is a layman 
and appeared as his own counsel at trial. 
On July 14, 1975 the defendant appeared in Court and presented 
the evidence that certain payments had been made. The plaintiffs ad-
mitted that they had received a payment of $500.00 on May 20, 1971, an-
other check for $500.00 on April 20, 1971 and an additional payment on 
the same date for $500.00. Plaintiffs further admitted that on the 
14th of September, 1971, they received a payment from the defendants in 
the amount of $2,139.00.(Tr.2,3). Defendant-appellant presented other 
evidence of payment which were not received by the Court. One cashiers 
check for $1,000.00 marked subdivision #3 was not admitted into evidence 
because subdivision #4 was the subdivision in dispute.(Tr.3,4). The 
defendant proferred to show that the check should have been credited to 
Subdivision #4. Mr. Gibb had disbursement records showing that the . 
check which was marked Subdivision #3 was actually applied to Subdivi-
sion #4.(Tr. 4,5). 
The Court stated at trial that the burden of proof was on 
the defendant-appellant at the July 14, 1975 hearing.(Tr.4). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED DEFENDANT'S 
EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES, 
Defendant was advised by the Court tha<- .,* «<ir\ *-• produce 
evidence of any payments or par t:i a ] paymei 1 t: mad-
tiff.(Tr.3). A t a 1 ater hearing the defendant attempted t Lh\/oduco 
ev:i dence that checks drawn on Benef i ci al Homes , AIK. . wer*- i ; - uhe 
plaintiff and that not withstanding the reference on sa^r
 tcc/. :.o 
Subdivision #3 tl lat said checks shoul d have been crediteu . 3>,uii-
visi on I I ) . •.' ' r ' • 
Defendant suggested that if the payment were not made to 
plaintiff toi Subdivision f}4 < /It<il were i v p^.J :or? (Tr ,4) :1 - «• 
Court responded that ' ' t:l: le bur dei :i i s oi I y< e go t: to si: 10 '" 
This again reflected the effect o: the ut-ra-atiu. reared, into **y 
tl ie • • • • : • • • • • *1 y p] aced npoi i 
the defendant. 
The court di d not accept defendants reasoning. He then 
attempted I :o si : :)v ;  1 .1 l a I 1 i E; 1 if i,<:I I ; ; • : c;l :i sbi urr* ? >ks an: id I: .1 la I: I .1 i = 
• checks marked Subdivision #3 were actually drawn on disbursement Sub-
division #4.(T i : „ 5,6,7&8) 
Tl ie Coi i r t: r e \fused I; : ei ;:<: uiti n< i i s a ii I Subdi i/:i s i oi I 1 Dooks . The 
Court continued by stating that "the checks might have been for an 
automobile as iar as i kiiow."(Tr. 5 ) . 
The evidence concerning the - ^.j/vusij: disbursement 
books prof erred by the defendant were _._: admitted • trial Court. 
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The effect of this ruling was that in spite of the fact that such 
payments had been made to the plaintiff, and despite the fact that 
plaintiff had not demonstrated the checks were indeed not to be 
credited to the account in dispute, defendant was placed in the 
unfortunate position of having to prove a negative, ie. that the 
checks to the plaintiff were not in payment for an automobile or 
whatever as suggested by the trial court. This again reflects the 
effect of the shift and the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the 
defendant. The defendant produced checks that were paid to and 
cashed by the plaintiff but was not allowed credit for them. The 
inequitable result was that the plaintiff received the checks and 
additionally took judgment for the same amount and was thus unjustly 
enriched* 
It is important to note that no formal objection was ever 
made to the evidence concerning the two Subdivision disbursement 
books furnished by the defendant. Further, if the defendant could 
have demonstrated that the checks marked subdivision #3 were actually 
drawn for and in payment on subdivision #4 the evidence was certainly 
relevent to the material issues in the lawsuit. In view of these facts 
the evidence should have been admitted and the courts ruling on this 
evidence was erroneous. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR A 
CHECK FOR $2,139.00 WHICH WAS ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL. 
At the trial on July 14, 1975 the plaintiff admitted receiv-
ing a check from the defendant dated September 14, 1971 in the amount 
of $2,139.00. The plaintiff admitted that he had received the check 
and that it was the payment on Subdivision #4. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Notwithstanding this admission by the plaintiff, when the 
courts final findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed the 
Court stated that check No. 1212 in the amount of $2,139.00 was a 
down payment and had been previously credited to the defendants 
prior to the execution of the note on which they sued. This finding 
of fact was contrary to uncontroverted evidence that that check was 
a payment on Subdivision #4 and the plaintiff admitted receiving 
that as such payment. Further, said check was dated September 14, 1971 
(Tr. 3), which was nine months after the promissory note was executed. 
(Exhibit A attached to Complaint). 
It was error not to give defendant credit for the amount of 
$2,139.00. 
POINT III. 
THE STIPULATION BETWEEN PLAINTIFFfS COUNSEL AND DEFEND-
ANT ACTING AS HIS OWN COUNSEL WAS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS, 
UNREASONABLE AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
At the commencement of the trial below, plaintiff's counsel 
and defendant, acting as his own attorney, entered into a stipulation 
which was presented to the Court. Defendant is a layman. In present-
ing the stipulation to the Court, plaintiff's counsel stated: 
"Our stipulation, Your Honor, is that the plaintiff 
is to have judgment against the defendants Beneficial 
Homes and Ron Gibb in the amounts prayed for according 
to the prayer thereof with the stipulation that judge-
ment be granted against the defendant for and until 
July the 14th, 1975, during which time if the defend-
ants can produce documentation that they are Entitled 
to a credit as against that amount prayed for they 
should be granted that credit and judgment taken for 
that amount, if any; otherwise judgment will be en-
tered on July the 14th for the full amount provided 
that no documentation is presented by the defendants. 
(Tr. 2) . 
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The stipulation was later clarified to mean that judgment 
would not be entered until July 14, 197 5. However, even with that 
clarification, the terms of the agreement are virtually incomprehen-
sible, particularly concerning credit to be granted and how much 
judgment would be taken. 
The principal deficiency of the stipulation, however, is 
that it was unreasonable and against public policy. It was unreason-
able in that the plaintiff gave up nothing but received great benefit 
from the stipulation. The stipulation relieved the plaintiff of 
proving her case, that the defendant owed her money. For his efforts, 
the defendant was given the burden of proving that he had made payments 
to the plaintiff. The effect of the stipulation was to shift the bur-
den of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. By analogy to con-
tract law, the stipulation was without consideration on the part of 
the plaintiff for she gave up nothing of value. s 
It is elementary that a plaintiff seeking redress in the 
Courts has the burden of proving he is entitled to such redress. 
Like the defendant in a criminal case who is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty, the defendant in a civil case is presumed not to be 
indebted to the plaintiff until the plaintiff proves otherwise. The 
effect of the stipulation in this case was to deprive the defendant 
of this presumption and was contrary to the policy reasons support-
ing this fundamental principal of law. 
Still another but equally serious defect of the stipulation 
is that it is extremely doubtful that the defendant, a layman, under-
stood the terms or the effect of the stipulation. The record is 
void of any indication that either plaintiff's counsel or the Court 
explained the terms or effect of the stipulation. The stipulation Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was presented in confusing and contradictory language. (Tr.2). 
Whereupon, the Court asked the defendant if that was his agreement. 
(TR.2). It was not explained that the burden of proof, which in 
this case did indeed turn out to be a burden, would be shifted from 
the plaintiff to defendant. 
In the case of Deseret Sav. Bank v. Walker, 78 Utah 241, 
2P. 2d 609(1931) this Court had the opportunity to examine a stipu-
lation entered into by a layman. The Court concluded that the 
stipulation was effective and should be construed in the light of 
the allegations and admissions .in the pleadings because the layman 
was a man of affairs with business experience and, "Nothing is made 
to appear that he was either ignorant or inexperienced or that any 
advantage was taken of him, or that he did not fully comprehend the 
full meaning of his stipulation and the implications necessarily 
arising therefrom". This language infers that if it appeared that 
the stipulant was ignorant or inexperienced or that he was taken 
advantage of or did not comprehend the stipulation or its implica-
tions, the Court would not have enforced the stipulation. 
These are precisely the conditions that were present in the 
present case. Defendant was inexperienced in the law as evidenced 
by his entering into the stipulation in the first place and by his 
lack of understanding of procedure and rules of evidence.(Tr.2,5,6). 
-7-
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He was also probably taken advantage of although the discussions 
concerning the terms of the stipulation were off the record. But 
it is unlikely that he would stipulate away his rights if he had 
been explained the ramifications of such action. 
It is respectfully submitted that defendant should not 
have been bound by his stipulation. 
POINT IV. 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES OF $2,227.11 WERE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY FACTS AND WERE UNREASONABLE. 
Plaintiff's counsel filed a Complaint and made threevery 
brief court appearances in this case on June 9, 197 5, July 14, 197 5 
and July 21, 1975. For these services, plaintiff was awarded 
$2,227.11 for attorney's fees. 
No evidence was presented as to attorney's fees such as 
what services were rendered or how much time was involved. 
The parties did stipulate as to judgment but as suggested 
above, the stipulation is unenforceable. But even if it were a 
valid stipulation, the terms are vague and confusing. Plaintiff's 
counsel represented it as stating judgment would be granted as 
prayed and plaintiff did pray for attorney's fees of $2,227.11. 
But, the stipulation itself does not mention attorney's fees. It 
is apparent that the judgment referred to in the stipulation was a 
judgment for the amount claimed by plaintiff because the amount 
prayed for was to be credited if defendant could present certain 
documentation. No documentation could have any effect on the prayer 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for attorney's fees. Thus the stipulation only concerned the 
amount claimed owing or defendant was led to believe it did. 
Since the parties did not agree on the amount of 
attorney's fees, the Court was obliged to take evidence on the 
issue of the reasonableness of the attorney's fees which it 
did not do. F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc.17 Utah 
2d 80,404P.2d 670(1965); Provo City Corporation v. Cropper, 28 
Utah 2d. 1,497P. 2d 629(1972); Freed Finance Company v. Stoker 
Motor Company, Utah 2d, , 537P. 2d. 1039(1975). 
Assuming for sake of argument that the parties did 
stipulate as to attorney's fees, the court nonetheless had the 
obligation to examine reasonableness thereof. 
The attorney's fees were unsupported by evidence and in 
any event were unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court excluded presumably relevant evidence 
without objection which was proffered by the defendant Ron 
Gibb to demonstrate that he had made payments for which he 
had not received credit. Defendants were not given credit for 
a payment of $2,139.00 which plaintiffs admitted receiving. 
Defendant Gibb unknowingly entered into a stipulation that 
was confusing at best and unreasonable. The stipulation had 
the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendants. 
Finally, attorneys' fees were awarded the plaintiff which were 
not supported by evidence and in any event were unreasonable. 
-9-
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It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the trial court should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of February, 
1976. 
E. Nordell Weeks 
2^_V 
Ted Boyer 
MCMILLAN AND BROWNING 
102 0 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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